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1. Introduction
• Economic theory suggests that discrimination is price
sensitive and money an equalizer
• This means that discrimination decreases the higher
the private costs for the discriminator
• Economic reasoning: Discrimination comes at a price
for the discriminator
 Example: an employer discriminates against potential employees
with a non-white skin tone and thus may miss the best employees
who then work for a competitor.
 Imperfect competition leads to rents and rents can be used to
discriminate and they can be discrimination in itself. [Jomo, 2003].
 Competition reduces discrimination

 Is money an equalizer? And by how much?
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Forms of Discrimination [Bertrand et al.
2005 and Parsons et al 2011]
• Taste-based discrimination: Discriminating against a
person or group for personal reasons
• Statistical discrimination: Discriminating because the
membership of a certain group provides information about
a relevant characteristic
• Implicit discrimination: Unintentional and outside of the
discriminator’s awareness
• Positive Discrimination: Being disproportionately likely to
engage with a member of a certain group given the
prevalence of members of this group
• Negative Discrimination: Being less likely to engage with a
member of a certain group given its prevalence
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Brief Outline of Research Idea
• Analyzing whether poker players from a certain country
are
 significantly more likely to play against people from a certain
country (positive discrimination)
 significantly less likely to play against people from a certain country
(negative discrimination)

• Control if and by how much the discrimination vanishes
when stakes increase
 Main hypothesis A: Positive discrimination decreases with
increasing stakes.
 Main hypothesis B: Negative discrimination decreases with
increasing stakes.

 Determining the price elasticity of discrimination
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Data: Online Poker Database of the
University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH)
• Database includes (inter alia):






data on 4.6 million poker player identities over 6 months
information on origin of players
information on limits played (stakes)
Data collected 2009/2010 (before Black Friday)
10 minutes between data points

• Data used: Dataset used by other studies
 poker market size [Fiedler/Wilcke 2011a, 2011b, 2011c,
2011d, 2011e, 2012; Philander/Fiedler 2012]
 analyzing playing habits [Fiedler 2012a, 2012b, 2012c;
Wilcke 2013]
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Data used
• One week of No Limit Heads up tables at Full Tilt
Poker for stakes NL50 to NL20,000
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Steps of the Data Analysis
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Definition of Variables, Symmetric
Differences
• Frequencies of player observations from different
countries relative to all observations
• Expected absolute number of observations for each
country pair
• Expected frequency of a country pair relative to all
observations
• Ratio between the observed and expected observations of
a country pair
• The difference between the observed and the expected
observations of a country pair and its relative complement
These figures show which country pairings are observed
more often or less often than expected
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Definition of Variables, Non-Symmetric
Differences
• Observed frequency of a country pair relative to a country
i (and not relative to all observations)
• Expected frequency of a country pair relative to a country i
(Please note that this figure is different for the same player
pair depending on which country is country i)
• Difference between the observed relative frequency of a
country pair and its expected relative frequency relative to
a country
University of Hamburg
Institute of Law & Economics

Dr. Ingo Fiedler

9

Controlling for Time Differences
• Time differences between countries make it more or less
likely to encounter players from the other country at the
tables
• Interpretation of time differences:
 bonus on the probability of playing against players from countries
which have zero or little time difference
 discount on the probability of playing against players from countries
which have a high time difference

• Capturing time difffernces
 Grouping countries with identical time differences
 Determining effects via a regression on dummies
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Results #1: Positive Discrimination was
found
• No significant negative discrimination was found
• Significant positive discrimination was found in the so
called hom-bias (players from country A are more
likely to play against other people from country A)
• Result of Wilcoxon signe.d-rank test:
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Results #2: Positive Discrimination
decreases in stakes
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Interpretation #1
• People are willing to pay a premium to play with other
players from their country
• That is remarkable because the online poker environment
is purely virtual
• Is it because of the possibility of chatting in the same
language?
 Rather not, because:
o people chat very rarely in online poker and
o all languages except English are prohibited (words in foreign
languages are made unrecognizable)
 Also: Wilcoxon signed-rank test without English speaking countries
found the same result (and not a stronger one)
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Interpretation #2
• Players on the higher limits are not willing to pay the
(higher) price for the good „discrimination“
 Demand for discrimination decreases with an
increasing price
 Money is an equalizer in this setting
• Further analysis reveaeld a price elasticity of demand for
discrimination of -0.25 (very inelastic)
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Limitations
• Cases of country pairs with zero observations were
excluded
• Stickiness/status-quo bias: players are more likely to stick
to a table they are already sitting at than to switch tables
during the phase of ten minutes
• Transfer of the results from empirical analysis to the
estimate of a demand curve is limited
 too few data points/limits where a significant home bias is observed
 depends on the assumption that the price is increasing
proportionally with stakes
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Thank you for your kind attention!
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